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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Vance E. Thumm appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his
post-conviction petition.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
After a night of drinking, Thumm, Deven Ohls, and several other people went to
an early morning party at a Boise Budget Inn room that Thumm had rented. (Trial Tr. 1,
Vol. I, p.315, Ls.6-25, p.439, L.18 – p.470, L.7, p.493, L.8 – p.499, L.7, p.539, L.22 –
p.551, L.6; Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.696, L.3 – p.718, L.24, p.850, L.7 – p.864, L.10.) At some
point, Thumm physically attacked Ohls, striking him with a closed fist several times in
the head. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.499, L.8 – p.523, L.12; Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.718, L.25 – p.726,
L.15, p.865, L.9 – p.893, L.16.) Another person kicked Ohls and stabbed him in the
buttock. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.507, L.14 – p.508, L.21; Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.724, Ls.12-23,
p.869, L.16 – p.870, L.5.) The attack continued for a time, all over the hotel room and in
the bathroom. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.499, L.8 – p.523, L.12; Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.718, L.25 –
p.726, L.15, p.865, L.9 – p.893, L.16.)
The stated charged Thumm with aggravated battery, felony intimidation of a
witness, and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (See R., p.350; Prelim. Tr.,

1

The Idaho Supreme Court granted Thumm’s motion to take judicial notice of the trial
transcripts associated with the underlying case and direct appeal, State v. Thumm, Idaho
Supreme Court Docket No. 37512. (2/9/18 Order.) In this brief, the state refers to the
two volumes from this trial transcript simply as “Trial Tr., Vol. I” and “Trial Tr., Vol. II.”
1

p.1, L.23 – p.2, L.4. 2) The state dismissed the felony intimidation of a witness charge
during the preliminary hearing. (Prelim. Tr., p.37, Ls.17-20.) The state asserted that
Thumm was guilty of aggravated battery for “kicking and/or stomping and/or punching
and/or stabbing Deven Ohls about the face and/or body” and/or that Thumm aided and
abetted others who used such force on Ohls. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.50, L.16 – p.51, L.4.)
The state also charged Frankie Hughes, Chris Smith, and Paris Davis in connection with
the attack. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.974, L.24 – p.975, L.6.) Specifically, the state charged
Davis with solicitation of felony destruction of evidence and being an accessory to
Thumm’s aggravated battery for encouraging Thumm and Hughes to destroy the clothes
they wore at the time of the incident. (R., p.351; Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.51, L.20 – p.52, L.6.)
The district court granted the state’s motion to join Thumm’s and Davis’ cases together
for trial. (R., p.282.) Prior to trial, Thumm was represented by Nick Wollen from the
Ada County Public Defender’s Office.

(See R., p.351.)

On September 10, 2009,

approximately six weeks before the start of the jury trial, Thumm retained Virginia Bond
as private counsel. (See R., pp.246, 351.)
Police testimony and photographs admitted at the jury trial revealed the aftermath
of the mêlée in the hotel room – a beaten and bloody Ohls, and a blood-spattered hotel
room in disarray. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.369, L.16 – p.430, L.19.) Ohls suffered significant
bleeding, a concussion, two black eyes, a complex lip laceration, a nasal fracture, and the
stab wound. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.257, Ls.2-19, Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.619, L.9 – p.644, L.23.)
2

The district court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript. (R., p.76.)
The Idaho Supreme Court granted Thumm’s motion to take judicial notice of the “trial
transcripts.” In his Appellant’s brief, Thumm cites to the preliminary hearing transcript.
(See, e.g., Appellant’s brief, pp.28-29.) The state presumes that the Idaho Supreme
Court’s order taking judicial notice includes the preliminary hearing transcript, and in the
alternative, moves for the Court to take judicial notice of this transcript.
2

State trial witnesses Hughes and Jeremy Steinmetz testified that they witnessed Thumm
battering Ohls in the hotel room. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.723, L.12 – p.726, L.9; p.866, L.24
– p.884, L.4.) In its closing argument, the state argued that other evidence presented by
the state corroborated the eyewitness testimony of Hughes and Steinmetz. (Trial Tr. Vol.
II, p.1096, L.7 – p.1109, L.8; p.1171, L.1 – p.1184, L.16.)
The jury found Thumm and Davis guilty as charged. (See R., p.351.) The district
court imposed a unified 40-year sentence with 15 years fixed upon Thumm. (Trial Tr.,
Vol. I, p.1360, L.25 – p.1361, L.5.) In a published opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of conviction. State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 285 P.3d 348 (Ct.
App. 2012).
Through counsel, Thumm filed a post-conviction petition, and then an amended
post-conviction petition containing additional claims and evidence. (R., pp.7-65, 138211.)

Collectively, the petitions asserted approximately 15 claims and sub-claims

asserting ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; a Brady 3 violation,
prosecutorial misconduct, and cumulative error. (Id.) The state filed an Answer, Motion
for Summary Dismissal and brief in support, and supplemental briefing. (R., pp.102-130,
214-218.) The state alleged that each of Thumm’s claims was conclusory, inadequately
supported, waived, and/or otherwise failed as a matter of law. (Id.)
After a hearing (Tr.), the district court granted the state’s motion for summary
dismissal. (R., pp.348-393.) The court concluded that Thumm failed to allege facts
which, if true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief on any of his claims. (Id.) Thumm
timely appealed. (R., pp.409-411.)

3

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3

ISSUES
Thumm states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the court erred in summarily dismissing the petition for
post-conviction relief.
(Appellant’s brief, p.10 (capitalization modified).)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Thumm failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims?

2.

Has Thumm failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims?

3.

Has Thumm failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his Brady claim?

4.

Has Thumm failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his prosecutorial misconduct claims?

5.

Has Thumm failed to demonstrate cumulative error?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Thumm Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred By Summarily
Dismissing His Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claims
A.

Introduction
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. 4 (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-39.) However, as
the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.350-393), these claims fails because Thumm
has failed to allege facts which, if true, demonstrate he is entitled to relief.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on
file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007).

C.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Each Of Thumm’s Ineffective Assistance
Of Trial Counsel Claims
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of
establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802;
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
4

In addition to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims the state responds to in
Issue I, Thumm also raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel as an alternative
argument to his direct Brady and prosecutorial misconduct claims. The state address
these claims below, in the context of its response to those direct claims.
5

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the
applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg v. State,
131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).

Until controverted by the state,

allegations in a verified post-conviction application are, for purposes of determining
whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545,
531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the
applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
applicant’s conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774
P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do
not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho
at 649, 873 P.2d at 903.
An attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State,
110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775
P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation
of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable….”

6

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. A defense counsel’s choice of witnesses, manner of crossexamination, and lack of objections to testimony are generally considered to be tactical or
strategic decisions. Grove v. State, 161 Idaho 840, 851, 392 P.3d 18, 29 (Ct. App. 2017)
(citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 877 P.2d 365 (1994)). Therefore, such decisions can
be considered deficient performance pursuant to Strickland only if made on the basis of
an ignorance of the law, inadequate preparation, or another shortcoming capable of
objective review. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 384, 313 P.3d 1, 40 (2013); Giles, 125
Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368.
To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v.
State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 245 (Ct. App. 1999). Where the alleged
deficiency is trial counsel’s failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if
pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court is generally determinative of both
prongs of the Strickland test. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 512, 988 P.2d 1170, 1186
(1999).
In this case, Thumm challenges the district court’s summary dismissal of
approximately 15 ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims and subclaims, including ineffective assistance of counsel claims that function as alternative
arguments to direct claims of trial error.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.11-39.)

Thumm’s

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims generally constitute a second-guessing of the
manner in which Thumm’s trial counsel chose to cross-examine witnesses, made or
declined to make objections, or argued legal issues to the court. The state submits that

7

each of these claims is conclusory, inadequately supported by law and fact, and/or
otherwise fails to demonstrate Strickland deficiency, particularly when considered in the
context of trial counsel’s authority to make strategic decisions throughout the course of a
four-day jury trial with 11 witnesses. Likewise, the state asserts that Thumm has failed to
demonstrate Strickland prejudice with respect to any of his ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, and that the individual portions of the trial upon which Thumm bases his
numerous criticisms of counsel’s performance did not have an impact upon the critical
issues of the case and the determinations made by the jury, particularly in light of the
strength of the state’s case. (See Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.1087, L.16 – p.1123, L.10, p.1163, L.1
– p.1185, L.21 (the prosecutor summarizing the evidence against Thumm and Davis in
his closing and rebuttal arguments).)
In fact, Thumm appears to have acknowledged that the majority of his ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims do not, by themselves, demonstrate he is entitled to
relief. He instead asserts that the claims combine to demonstrate cumulative prejudice.
In the hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, Thumm described his postconviction petition as presenting a “bag of problems,” and stated that while “[m]ost of
[the problems] I can’t point out and say: Yeah, he would have been acquitted based on
this specific one,” that the court should look cumulatively at “what happened from
beginning to end.” (Tr., p.31, L.25 – p.32, L.8.) Likewise, in his Appellant’s brief,
Thumm noted that he “raises many errors with the first two being the most significant
and the rest having a more cumulative effect.” (Appellant’s brief, p.1.) While, as
discussed below, prejudice may be cumulated in a Strickland analysis, the state submits
that Thumm’s “kitchen sink” approach reveals a difficulty in establishing Strickland

8

deficient performance or prejudice with respect to any individual claim. Further, even in
a cumulative error analysis, there is no prejudice to cumulate when a petitioner has failed
to demonstrate more than one incident of deficient performance. See Commonwealth v.
Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 321 (Pa. 2011).
The district court correctly concluded that Thumm failed to demonstrate
Strickland deficient performance and/or prejudice with respect to any of his ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims.

To the extent this Court construes or organizes

Thumm’s claims differently than the state has in this brief, the state adopts the reasoning
set forth by the district court in its order granting the state’s motion for summary
dismissal. (See R., pp.348-393).

D.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Thumm’s Ineffective Assistance Of Trial
Counsel Claims Related To The Joinder Of Thumm’s and Davis’ Cases For Trial
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the state’s motion to join
Thumm’s and Davis’ cases for trial and/or for failing to file a motion to sever the cases
prior to, or during, the trial. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-21.) However, as the district court
correctly concluded (R., pp.356-367), Thumm failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient
performance or prejudice.
Several months prior to trial, the state moved to join Thumm’s, Davis’, and
Hughes’ cases for trial. 5 (See R., p.278.) At a subsequent hearing, the state argued that
joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 8 and 13 was appropriate because there were a number of
common trial witnesses between the cases and because the charges all arose from the
5

For reasons that are not clear from the appellate record in this case, Hughes was
ultimately not tried with Thumm and Davis. (See generally Trial Tr.)
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same act or transaction. (Id.) An attorney from the Ada County Public Defender’s
Office, which represented Thumm at the time, sought a continuance because she was not
the handling attorney on the case and was not familiar with the relevant facts and issues.
(Id.) Davis’ counsel objected to the state’s motion on the ground that joinder would be
prejudicial to Davis. (R., pp.278-279. 6) At a continued hearing, Nick Wollen, Thumm’s
handling attorney from the Public Defender’s Office, informed the court that Thumm
intended to retain private counsel.

(R., p.282.) Wollen did not address the state’s

pending motion for joinder, but asked the court to continue the scheduled jury trial. (See
id.) Davis’ counsel renewed her objection to the state’s motion. (Id.) The district court
granted the state’s motion for joinder and continued the jury trial. (Id.) The court stated
that it “[d]id not see any issue that required that these matters be subject to separate
trials,” but that “as the case develops, something could occur that could require that.”
(Id.)
During the trial, the state elicited evidence which, Thumm now asserts
(Appellant’s brief, pp.13-21), prejudiced him because it would not have been admissible
had he been tried individually. Specifically, both Jeremy Steinmetz and Frankie Hughes
testified that, after the attack in the hotel room, Paris Davis told Thumm that he was
“going to prison.”

(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.755, Ls.15-21; p.899, Ls.21-23.)

Hughes

additionally testified that Davis told Thumm and Hughes, after the attack, that they
needed to burn their clothes, which had blood on them. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.899, L.24 –
p.901, L.22.) These statements from Davis, Thumm asserts, would have constituted

6

Portions of the transcripts of the two pretrial hearings related to the joinder issue were
included in the clerk’s record on appeal.
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inadmissible hearsay, as opposed to admissible statements of a party opponent, if Thumm
had been tried individually. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-21.)
Additionally, Thumm points to evidence that was admitted to prove that Davis
had knowledge that Thumm committed a felony, a necessary element of her charges of
solicitation of felony destruction of evidence, I.C. § 18-2503, and accessory to the
commission of a felony, I.C. § 18-205. (Appellant’s brief, pp.18-20.) This evidence
included: the nature of the high-risk felony traffic stop of Thumm’s and Davis’ vehicle, a
stop which involved multiple police vehicles and officers with their weapons drawn; a
testifying officer’s unsolicited blurt that Thumm invoked his right to silence during his
arrest; 7 and Davis’ counsel’s concession during closing argument that Davis was guilty of
misdemeanor solicitation of destruction of evidence. (Id.) Additionally, Thumm asserted
he was prejudiced by: a jury instruction involving Davis’ charges which, Thumm argued,
assumed the truth of the charges against Thumm; and the fact that Thumm was required
to split his preemptory challenges with Davis, who would have been looking for a
different type of jury. (Id.)
The state construes this claim as encompassing two parts: (1) that trial counsel
was ineffective for declining to object to the state’s pretrial motion for joinder; and (2)
that trial counsel was ineffective for declining to utilize a Bruton 8 challenge to sever the
cases, either prior to or during trial.

Thumm has failed to demonstrate Strickland

deficient performance or prejudice with respect to either of these sub-claims.

7

In affirming Thumm’s judgment of conviction, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that this
unobjected-to blurt did not constitute fundamental error. Thumm, 153 Idaho at 541-542,
285 P.3d at 356-357.
8

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
11

1.

Thumm’s Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Object To
The State’s Pretrial Motion For Joinder

Idaho Criminal Rule 8(b) provides that joinder of defendants is proper “if they are
alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or
transactions, constituting an offense or offenses.” “The propriety of joinder is determined
by what is alleged, not what the proof eventually shows.” State v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71,
73, 539 P.2d 999, 1001 (1975).
The purpose of joinder is to promote judicial efficiency and “conserve state funds,
diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing
those accused of crime to trial.” United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)
(quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968)). For these reasons, federal
courts and some state courts broadly construe the language of Rule 8 in favor of joinder.
See, e.g., United States v. Rock, 282 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting federal rule 8(a)
is broadly construed in favor of joinder); State v. Reeder, 182 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2006) (noting that “liberal joinder” is favored in the interest of judicial economy).
Thumm has failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient performance or prejudice
with respect to this sub-claim. As the district court concluded (R., p.366), the initial
joinder of the cases was proper, and therefore, any objection from Thumm’s counsel
would have been unsuccessful – just as Davis’ counsel’s objection was unsuccessful. The
state’s charging information alleged that Thumm and Davis participated in the same
series of acts or transactions constituting the offenses charged. (See Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.50,
L.8 – p.52, L.6.) Further, the only prejudice alleged by Thumm as a result of the joinder
concerned statements and evidence presented at the subsequent trial. Thumm has not
attempted to argue how, or if, his trial counsel should have anticipated the presentation of
12

this particular evidence at the time of the state’s pretrial joinder motion.

Further,

considering the strength of the state’s case, Thumm has failed to demonstrate that an
individual trial, and the absence of the highlighted evidence discussed above, would have
resulted in an acquittal.
2.

Thumm’s Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Move To
Sever The Cases Prior To, Or During, The Trial

In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the United States Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant from incriminating out-of-court
statements of co-defendants being used against him in a joint trial where the co-defendant
does not testify and thereby does not become subject to cross-examination. In that case,
Bruton was tried with a co-defendant, Evans. Id. at 124. Evans did not testify at the trial,
but evidence of Evans’ pretrial confessions were admitted into evidence. Id. at 124-128,
136. These confessions implicated Bruton in the charges against him. Id. The United
States Supreme Court held that introduction of Evans’ confessions added substantial
weight to the prosecution’s case in a form that was not subject to cross-examination,
thereby violating Bruton’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Id. at 126-137.
However, in order to implicate the confrontation clause as interpreted by Bruton,
a co-defendant’s incriminating statement must be “testimonial” in nature. See United
States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 643, 651 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Bruton is simply irrelevant in the
context of nontestimonial statements.”); United States v. Clark, 717 F.3d 790, 816 (10th
Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause upon which it is premised,
does not apply to nontestimonial hearsay statements.”) (citation omitted); United States v.
Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 65-66 (1st Cir. 2010) (“the Bruton rule does not apply to nontestimonial hearsay statements.”); United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed. Appx. 449, 454 (6th
13

Cir. 2008) (“The statement at issue…is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not
implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”)
Whether a statement is testimonial is determined by looking at the statement’s
primary purpose and its similarities to traditional testimony. State v. Stanfield, 158 Idaho
327, 332, 347 P.3d 175, 180 (2015) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822
(2006)). Testimony is defined as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 51 (2004)). Therefore, a statement is testimonial when “the circumstances
objectively indicate that…the primary purpose…is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
When no such primary purpose exists, the statement is nontestimonial and its
admissibility is governed by state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation
Clause. Id. (citing Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358-359 (2011)). Further, the codefendant’s statement, even if testimonial, must be “directly incriminating” against the
defendant in order for Bruton to apply. State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 337-339, 193
P.3d 878, 884-886 (Ct. App. 2008).
Parties properly joined under I.C.R. 8(b) may later be severed under I.C.R. 14 if it
appears that one of the defendants or the state would be prejudiced by a joinder of
defendants for trial. State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State
v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71, 73, 539 P.2d 999, 1001 (1975). The defendant has the burden of
showing such prejudice. Caudill, 109 Idaho at 226, 706 P.2d at 460; Cochran, 97 Idaho at
74, 539 P.2d at 1002. An I.C.R. 14 motion to sever must be filed within 28 days after the
entry of a plea of not guilty or seven days before trial, whichever is earlier. I.C.R.
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12(b)(5), (d). However, I.C.R. 14 also permits a trial court to shorten or enlarge the time
to file, and, for good cause shown or for excusable neglect, to relieve a party of the
failure to comply with the timeliness requirement of the rule.
In the federal system, pursuant to the analogous F.R.C.P. 14, severance is not
mandated “whenever codefendants have conflicting defenses.” Zafiro v. United States,
506 U.S. 534, 538 (1993). Thus, “mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per
se” and F.R.C.P. 14 does not require severance even if some prejudice is shown. Id. at
538–539. Further, criminal defendants “are not entitled to severance merely because they
may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials.” Id. at 540. Instead, severance is
proper “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial
right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about
guilt or innocence.” Id. at 539; see
also ------------------United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110,
- --1121-1126 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing Zafiro and analyzing F.R.C.P. 14).
As the district court correctly concluded (R., p.365), there was no Bruton problem
in this case, either evident before trial, or considering the evidence admitted at trial,
because no testimonial statements of Davis directly incriminating Thumm were admitted.
Davis’ statement to Thumm that he was going to prison, and her statement to Thumm and
Hughes that they needed to burn their bloody clothes, were clearly not made for the
primary purpose of creating evidence for a subsequent trial. Therefore, Thumm has
failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective for not attempting to raise a
Bruton-based motion to sever before trial, or a motion for a mistrial during trial, because
such a motion would not have been successful. Thumm has also failed to demonstrate
that he would have been acquitted had he been tried individually.
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Additionally, the state submits that while Thumm has pointed to various evidence
submitted at trial which, he asserts, demonstrates prejudice from the joinder, he has, on
appeal, relied exclusively on a constitutional framework pursuant to Bruton. Thumm has
not argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a pretrial motion, or a
motion for a mistrial, pursuant to I.C.R. 14 and I.C.R. 29.1. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp.13-21.) Therefore, any such argument is waived on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho
192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). In any event, the state submits that any pretrial
motion or motion for a mistrial made pursuant to I.C.R. 14 would have been
unsuccessful.

The statements and evidence implicating Davis did not implicate or

prejudice Thumm, particularly in light of the strength of the state’s case against Thumm.
Finally, in the alternative, 9 and as the district court concluded (R., pp.359-361),
Davis’ statements would have been admissible under the excited utterance exception to
the hearsay exception even had Davis and Thumm been tried separately.

For this

assertion, the state adopts the reasoning as set forth by the district court. (Id.)

9

On appeal, Thumm asserts that the district court should not have even reached the
Bruton issue because its Bruton analysis begins with the “faulty premise” that Davis’
statements would have been admissible even if Thumm was tried individually.
(Appellant’s brief, p.18.) The state submits that this is backwards. There is no Bruton
problem in this case because no testimonial statements of Davis directly incriminating
Thumm were admitted at trial. This is the end of Bruton inquiry. Whether or not Davis’
statements would have been admissible against Thumm had he been tried individually is
only relevant if this Court concludes that Thumm’s trial counsel was deficient for failing
to move to sever the cases pursuant to a Bruton challenge or I.C.R. 14 motion. In such an
instance, the theoretical admissibility of the statements in an individual trial would be
relevant (if not determinative) to a determination of whether Thumm was prejudiced by
the joint trial and his trial counsel’s failure to obtain a severance. In other words, even if
Thumm’s trial counsel should have raised a motion to sever, and even if the district court
would have granted such a motion – Thumm still cannot demonstrate he is entitled to
relief because, as the court concluded, Davis’ statements would have been admissible
against him regardless pursuant to the excited utterance exception.
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E.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Thumm’s Ineffective Assistance Of Trial
Counsel Claims Related To Counsels’ Pre-Trial Representation
1.

Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective With Respect To Her Attempt To
Suppress A Photo Lineup Utilized By Officers

Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely and adequately move to suppress
a photo lineup utilized by officers that was admitted into evidence. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.38-39.) However, as the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.372-373), Thumm
has failed to demonstrate he was entitled to relief on this claim.
Shortly before trial, Thumm’s counsel filed a motion to suppress State’s Exhibit
66, a photo lineup containing Thumm that investigators had presented to a state witness,
on the ground that the lineup identification procedure was suggestive. (R., pp.268-269;
Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.30, L.19 – p.31, L.2.) The district court did not rule on the motion, but
informed counsel that she could make an appropriate objection when the evidence was
presented at trial. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.31, Ls.3-5.) During the trial, the state sought to
admit the lineup through witness Detective Leavitt. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.290, L.12 – p.292,
L.15.) Thumm’s trial counsel objected and questioned Detective Leavitt in aid of the
objection. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.292, L.16 – p.295, L.24.) Counsel then argued that the
lineup procedure utilized was faulty. (Trial. Tr., Vol. I, p.296, Ls.5-8.) The district court
overruled the objection, concluding that a written admonition that was presented to the
witness by Detective Leavitt indicated compliance with the policy established by the law
enforcement agency, and that questions regarding the adequacy of the notice went to the
weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. (Trial. Tr., Vol. I, p.296, L.24 – p.297,
L.17.)
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In summarily dismissing this claim, the district court first noted that trial counsel
did object to the admission of the photo lineup, and that counsel was thus clearly aware
of the relevant potential legal implications of an unduly suggestive photo lineup. (R.,
p.372.) This indicates the manner in which trial counsel chose to make the objection was
strategic, rather than being based upon some objective shortcoming such as ignorance of
the relevant law. Additionally, Thumm has failed to demonstrate that any alternative
argument raised in support of trial counsel’s objection would have been successful.
Thumm has therefore failed to demonstrate deficient performance.
The district court also concluded that Thumm failed to demonstrate prejudice
because he failed to show how the outcome of the trial would have been different had the
lineup not been admitted. (R., p.373.) As the district court noted, Thumm was identified
as a perpetrator in the aggravated battery by Hughes and Steinmetz, who both knew
Thumm. (R., pp.372-373.) Additionally, the identification of Thumm generated by the
photo lineup was of limited evidentiary value in this case because the lineup was
presented to Aaron Childress – who was simply the employee at the hotel who checked
Thumm in on the night of the attack. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.290, L.12 – p.299, L.23.) It is
not clear from the existing appellate record in this case whether this lineup was utilized to
elicit any other witness identifications that were presented at trial.
2.

Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Provide Physical
Discovery To Thumm Prior To The Trial

Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide him physical copies of the
discovery prior to the trial. (Appellant’s brief, p.38.) The state construes this claim as
containing two parts: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective for entering into a pretrial
18

stipulation limiting Thumm’s personal access to discovery; and (2) whether trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to provide Thumm with physical copies of discovery
documents that were not subject to the stipulation. In both respects, the district court
correctly dismissed this claim (R., pp.374-375) because it fails as a matter of law.
Prior to trial, Thumm’s counsel entered into a stipulated protective order with the
state preventing anyone from disclosing the addresses of potential trial witnesses, or
physically transferring police reports or compact discs related to the case to Thumm.
(See R., p.374.) The state asserted that this action was necessary because Thumm’s
association with the Severely Violent Criminals gang created a concern that Thumm may
hurt others associated with the case. (See id.)
In summarily dismissing this claim, the district court concluded that Thumm
failed to identify any specific discovery he was denied access to, or explain how such
access would have changed the outcome of his trial. (Id.) Thumm also failed to argue
that the stipulation entered into by trial counsel was somehow unwarranted, or that
defense counsel would have successfully gotten access to the materials had she refused to
enter into the stipulation. Further, in her response to Thumm’s bar complaint regarding
the stipulation, trial counsel explained that she was concerned about delays in obtaining
complete redacted discovery in light of the fact that she was retained by Thumm
relatively late in the criminal proceeding. (R., pp.247-252.) Additionally, trial counsel
stated that she felt the stipulation was warranted given Thumm’s violent history, that she
was genuinely concerned that Thumm was a member of a gang that could use violence to
protect its members, and that the protection order could protect Thumm from any
criminal accusations should anything happen to any of the witnesses prior to trial. (Id.)

19

Thumm has failed to demonstrate that it was some objective shortcoming, rather than a
tactical decision, that prompted trial counsel to enter into the stipulation, or that he was
prejudiced by this decision.
Likewise, Thumm has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s decision not to
provide him with physical copies of discovery that was not subject to the stipulated
protection order constituted deficient performance, or how he was prejudiced from lack
of access to physical discovery. Thumm’s counsel’s decision not to provide Thumm
physical copies of discovery does not constitute deficient performance.

In her bar

complaint response, counsel noted that she met with Thumm frequently to discuss the
evidence in the case – though there was not enough time to get through everything “page
by page.” (R., pp.248-250.) With respect to the Strickland prejudice prong, Thumm
contends that if he had been given personal access to the discovery, he would have been
able to better assist trial counsel on issues (discussed in greater detail below) related to a
fingerprint report disclosed by the state (Appellant’s brief, p.38).

However, while

Thumm raised a similar argument in a brief filed in response to the state’s motion for
summary dismissal (R., p.235), Thumm did not present admissible evidence supporting
this assertion. Further, Thumm’s claim that he himself would have not only identified
some relevant issue related to the fingerprint report (which, as discussed below, was not
disclosed by the state until shortly before trial), but that he could have utilized this
knowledge to assist his counsel and obtain a different trial outcome is optimistically
speculative.
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3.

Thumm’s Other Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claims Related
To Counsels’ Pre-Trial Representation Are Waived On Appeal

On appeal, Thumm identifies other ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims
related to trial counsels’ pretrial representation that were raised in his amended postconviction petition. 10 (Appellant’s brief, pp.37-38.) Further, Thumm noted that while he
was “expressly appealing the dismissal of the entire petition and all claims” he would
discuss only two of the claims related to his trial counsels’ pretrial representation in his
Appellant’s brief. (Appellant’s brief, p.13.) The remainder of Thumm’s claims related to
his trial counsels’ pretrial representation are waived because Thumm failed to support
them with argument or authority on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923
P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument
are lacking”). In the alternative, should this Court choose to reach the merits of these
claims, the state adopts the reasoning set forth by the district court as to why these claims
fail. (R., pp.368-372, 375-376.)

F.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Thumm’s Ineffective Assistance Of Trial
Counsel Claims Related To Thumm’s Counsel’s Trial Representation
1.

Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Object To The
District Court’s Rulings Regarding The Admissibility, As Impeachment
Evidence, Of The Gang Memberships Of Potential Defense Witnesses

Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim
that his trial counsel was ineffective for declining to challenge and/or by inadequately
challenging the district court’s rulings regarding the admissibility, as impeachment
10

In his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm additionally asserted that trial counsel
was ineffective for: (1) failing to timely disclose an expert witness who would have
purportedly provided exculpatory evidence; (2) missing a deadline to submit redacted
tapes; and (3) failing to adequately prepare for state witness Helen Fischer’s testimony.
(R., pp.160, 171-172, 190.)
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evidence, of gang memberships and associations of potential defense witnesses.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.32-35.) However, as the district court properly concluded (R.,
pp.376-379), this claim fails as a matter of law.
Prior to the jury trial, the district court ruled that evidence of membership or close
association with the Severely Violent Criminal gang was admissible at trial, but only to
impeach witnesses’ credibility. (See R., p.376.) Thumm’s trial counsel did not object to
this ruling and conceded that gang membership evidence could be used for impeachment
purposes with respect to Davis, Thumm, and another individual. (See id.) Later, during
the trial, counsel raised the gang membership issue with respect to two other potential
witnesses – Ariel Carpenter and Chris Smith. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.941, L.4 – p.942, L.8.)
Counsel stated that she was concerned that if she called Carpenter or Smith to testify, the
state would argue that they were associates of the Severely Violent Criminal gang, and
would ultimately be able to impeach them on this association. (Id.) Counsel further
noted that Chris Smith was a documented gang member, albeit not a member of the
Severely Violent Criminal gang. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.942, Ls.1-8.) Counsel did not
discuss Carpenter’s gang membership or non-membership. (See Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.941,
L.4 – p.942, L.8.) The district court cited United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), and
informed Thumm’s counsel that defense witnesses may be impeached on their gang
memberships, or on their gang associations if they were not members of the same gang.
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.942, L.9 – p.945, L.1.) The state informed the court that, should it
become necessary, it possessed evidence that Smith was associated with Hughes and
Thumm. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.943, Ls.5-20.) Thumm’s counsel did not call either Smith
or Carpenter as witnesses at the trial.
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On direct appeal, Thumm asserted that the district court erred by ruling that,
should the defense call Smith to testify, the state would be permitted to impeach his
testimony with information that both Thumm and Smith were alleged gang members.
Thumm, 153 Idaho at 538-540, 285 P.3d at 353-355. The Idaho Court of Appeals first
rejected the state’s arguments that Thumm failed to preserve this claim for appeal, and
that the district court did not enter an appealable ruling on the issue. Id. at 538-539, 285
P.3d at 353-354. The Court then rejected Thumm’s argument that, pursuant to Abel,
individuals had to be members of the same gang in order to be subject to gang
membership-related impeachment. Id. at 539-540, 285 P.3d 354-355. The Court instead
held that Abel reaffirmed the proposition that a district court has the discretion to
determine admissibility of evidence showing bias, including evidence of gang
membership, and is not foreclosed from admitting such evidence where the individuals in
question are members of different gangs. Id. Then, applying its traditional standards
related to a court’s use of discretion, it held that the district court did not err in concluding
that any evidence of Smith’s gang association with Thumm would be relevant as
impeachment evidence. Id. at 540, 285 P.3d at 354.
In his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm asserted that his trial counsel
was ineffective for: (1) failing to raise a constitutional challenge to the district court’s
impeachment rulings, as opposed to merely a rules of evidence-based Abel challenge; (2)
failing to challenge the district court’s “expansion” of its pretrial impeachment ruling to
include Smith and Carpenter; and (3) failing to challenge the district court’s conclusion
that Abel permitted gang membership-related impeachment even when the individuals
are not members of the same gang. (R., pp.166-170.)
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Thumm has failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient performance or prejudice
with respect to any of these sub-claims. First, with respect to all three sub-claims,
Thumm has failed to demonstrate that any of the defense witnesses would have testified
absent the court’s rulings, or identified what any of these witnesses would have testified
about. This alone is fatal to the claim and each associated sub-claim. While, in his
response to the state’s motion for summary dismissal (R., p.239), and Appellant’s brief
(Appellant’s brief, pp.34-35), Thumm utilized police reports to speculate as to what
Smith and Carpenter may have testified about, he has not presented any affidavits or
other admissible evidence supporting this speculation. Further, the jury was made aware
of perhaps the most significant element of this speculated testimony – that Chris Smith
punched and stabbed Ohls during the mêlée – through Thumm’s defense counsel’s crossexamination of Detective Holland. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.988, L.24 – p.990, L.23.)
Thumm has also failed to demonstrate that any constitutional challenge would
have been successful. In his Appellant’s brief, as in his amended post-conviction petition
(R., p.166 n.2), Thumm cited cases standing for broad concepts associated with the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants to present a defense. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.32, n.13 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (right of a defendant to testify
in his own behalf); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (right to crossexamine); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (right to present a meaningful
defense)). However, Thumm has failed to demonstrate or explain how any of these
concepts, if argued, would have resulted in a different district court ruling regarding the
admissibility of gang associations as impeachment evidence in this case.
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This is

particularly true in light of the well-established principle that a state court’s application of
its own state’s evidentiary rules generally does not offend the constitution. See, e.g.,
Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 (reaffirming that an accused’s right to present relevant evidence
“may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal
trial process” (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295)); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
690 (1986) (“we have never questioned the power of States to exclude evidence through
the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and
reliability - even if the defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted”); Chambers,
410 U.S. at 301 (“the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established
rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the
ascertainment of guilt and innocence”); Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 509 (2013)
(“[o]nly rarely have we held that the right to present a complete defense was violated by
the exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of evidence”). Thumm has not
demonstrated that the district court’s application of Abel in this case is the “rare”
situation where the correct application of state evidentiary rules violates the constitution.
Therefore, Thumm has failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective for not making
such an argument, or that the district court erred by summarily dismissing this claim.
Also, Thumm has failed to argue, below or on appeal, that Carpenter was, in fact,
not a member or associate of the Severely Violent Criminals gang. Instead, Thumm
appears to rely on the fact that the state did not present evidence of Carpenter’s gang
association. (Appellant’s brief, pp.32-33.) At the trial, the district court simply ruled that
evidence of gang membership or close association, if the state could present it, would be
admissible as impeachment evidence. Thumm’s trial counsel was in the best position to
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evaluate the risks of facing such impeachment evidence should Carpenter be called as a
witness. Thumm has failed to demonstrate that this evaluation, and counsel’s decision
not to call Carpenter as a witness, constituted anything other than an execution of trial
strategy.
Finally, the Idaho Court of Appeals has already held, in the context of this case,
that the reasoning set forth by Abel does not preclude the admission, for impeachment
purposes, of gang-related associations even if the individuals are not a member of the
same gang. Thumm, 153 Idaho at 536-540, 285 P.3d at 351-355. Thumm has not
successfully demonstrated that the Court of Appeals’ opinion would have been different if
only trial counsel had raised this argument in some different manner. As the Court of
Appeals held, Thumm’s defense counsel properly preserved this issue for appeal. Id. at
539, 285 P.3d at 354. Therefore, the Court of Appeals had the jurisdiction to freely
review, de novo, the relevancy of the evidence, regardless of what arguments were
presented by Thumm. Id. at 540, 285 P.3d at 355.
2.

Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Impeach Jeremy
Steinmetz On Alleged Inconsistencies Between His Preliminary Hearing
Testimony And Trial Testimony, Or For Declining To Object To His
Testimony About Thumm’s Statements To Him After The Attack

Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim
that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to impeach Jeremy Steinmetz on
apparent inconsistencies between his preliminary hearing testimony and trial testimony
with respect to whether he was afraid of Thumm; and (2) failing to object to Steinmetz’s
testimony that Thumm told him “don’t say nothing” after the attack. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.27-30.) The district court correctly dismissed this claim (R., pp.381-382), because it
fails as a matter of law.
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During the pretrial investigation, Steinmetz failed to identify Thumm in a photo
lineup that was presented to him by police. (See Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.763, L.12 – p.764,
L.13.) At the jury trial, Steinmetz explained that while he could have identified Thumm
in the lineup, he declined to do so because he was “kind of scared” of implicating Thumm
to law enforcement. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.764, L.10 – p.765, L.10.) However, as noted by
Thumm in the post-conviction proceeding and on appeal, Steinmetz, at Thumm’s
preliminary hearing, testified that he chose not to identify Thumm in the photo lineup
because he was “just trying to protect [Thumm].” (Prelim. Tr., p.21, Ls.9-13.) The
district court overruled an objection to counsel’s follow-up question of whether Steinmetz
was “worried about what might happen if [Steinmetz] cooperated with police.” (Prelim.
Tr., p.21, Ls.14-18.)

Later in the hearing, Steinmetz testified that Thumm had not

threatened him, and that instead, Steinmetz had “changed his story” with police “[o]nly
after the police had told [Steinmetz] [Thumm’s] name,” which indicated to Steinmetz that
the police “knew [Thumm].” (Prelim. Tr., p.23, Ls.7-12.) Near the conclusion of the
preliminary hearing, immediately before the felony intimidation of the witness charge
was dismissed, Steinmetz, in responding to questioning from the magistrate court,
testified that he did not feel intimidated, threatened, or harassed by Thumm. (Prelim. Tr.,
p.36, L.5 – p.37, L.20.)
Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to utilize I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that,
several days after the attack, Thumm told Steinmetz, in the presence of Davis, “[d]on’t
say anything.” (See Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.36, L.8 – p.37, L.19.) On the first day of the trial,
the prosecutor discussed the I.R.E. 404(b) notice and explained that Thumm’s statement
was admitted at the preliminary hearing to attempt to prove the felony intimidation of a
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witness charge against Thumm – a charge that was ultimately dismissed. (Id.) The
prosecutor argued that the statement did not constitute I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, but, even
if the district court concluded otherwise, the statement should still be admitted because it
demonstrated Thumm’s consciousness of guilt and Davis’ knowledge of the attack. (Id.)
Thumm’s trial counsel objected to the admission of the statement. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.38,
Ls.14-24.) The district court noted that while, “at first blush,” the statement appeared to
be “overly prejudicial,” it would defer its ruling until the appropriate part of the trial so it
could analyze the statement in context. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.38, L.25 – p.39, L.5.) At the
trial, the prosecutor raised the issue again shortly prior to the anticipated introduction of
the statement. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.748, L.21 – p.749, L.5.) The district court ruled that
the statement was admissible. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.749, Ls.6-12.) Thumm’s trial counsel
did not attempt to renew her previous objection to the admission of the statement. (Id.)
Consistent with the ruling, Steinmetz later testified that Thumm told him “don’t say
nothing” several days after the attack. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.762, L.6 – p.763, L.4.)
Thumm has failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient performance or prejudice
with respect to either sub-claim. It is unsurprising that Thumm’s trial counsel would
choose not to delve into, on cross-examination, any specifics regarding whether
Steinmetz was afraid of Thumm. This was a reasonable tactical decision, particularly
considering it is unlikely that trial counsel could know, for certain, what Steinmetz’s
response to such impeachment questions might be. As the district court noted (R., p.382),
trial counsel may have been concerned that it was, in fact, Steinmetz’s fear of Thumm
that motivated him to deny, at the preliminary hearing, that Thumm had threatened or
harassed him. Also, it is notable that Thumm’s trial counsel did utilize the preliminary
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hearing transcript to cross-examine Steinmetz during the jury trial on a different topic.
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.796, L.17 – p.797, L.25.) The fact that Thumm’s trial counsel was
aware of the preliminary hearing transcript and Steinmetz’s testimony in it indicates that
her decision not to impeach Steinmetz on whether he was afraid of Thumm was tactical,
and not based upon some objective shortcoming, such as failing to review the preliminary
hearing transcript. Thumm has also failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to this
sub-claim, particularly in light of the strength of the state’s case.
Likewise, Thumm has failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient performance or
prejudice with respect to his sub-claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to Steinmetz’s testimony that Thumm told him, “don’t say nothing” after the
attack. First, this statement was properly admitted at trial, and therefore, it did not
constitute deficient performance for Thumm’s counsel to decline to renew her objection.
State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463, 235 P.3d 409, 413 (2010) (“Rule 404(b) allows
evidence of other acts if admitted for the purpose of showing knowledge or
consciousness of guilt….Evidence of a defendant’s efforts to influence or affect evidence,
such as intimidating a witness…may be relevant to demonstrate consciousness of guilt.”
(internal citation and footnote omitted)). Thumm also cannot demonstrate that the district
court’s decision to admit the evidence would have changed if only Thumm’s counsel had
renewed the objection. In fact, the district court’s decision to admit the evidence can be
read as an overruling of the objection that Thumm’s counsel already made. Finally,
Thumm has also failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to this sub-claim,
particularly in light of the strength of the state’s case.
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3.

Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Object To Paris
Davis’ Use Of The Term “Prison” At Trial

Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim
that his trial counsel was ineffective for declining to object to Paris Davis’ use of the term
“prison” at trial, a term which, Thumm asserts, was utilized as a legal conclusion.
(Appellant’s brief, p.31.) However, as the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.382383), this claim fails as a matter of law.
Before the start of the jury trial, the prosecutor informed the court of the
anticipated trial evidence that Paris Davis told Thumm, after the attack, that he was
“going to prison.” (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.31, L.16 – p.32, L.16.) Thumm’s counsel objected
to the testimony on the ground that, because Davis is not a legal expert, her opinion or
understanding regarding whether Thumm was going to prison was not relevant. (Trial
Tr., Vol. I, p.32, L.18 – p.33, L.4.) Davis’ counsel also objected to the admission of the
statements. (Trial. Tr., Vol. I, p.33, L.7 – p.34, L.5.) The district court deferred its ruling
until it could analyze the issue with the appropriate factual context during the trial. (Trial
Tr., Vol. I, p.35, L.14 – p.36, L.7.)

Prior to the admission of the statements, the

prosecutor brought the matter to the attention of the district court. (Trial Tr., Vol. II,
p.742, L.20 – p.743, L.20.) Thumm’s counsel expressed concern that the prosecutor
might inappropriately lead the witnesses to make the statement at issue. (Trial. Tr., Vol.
II, p.743, L.23 – p.744, L.3.) The district court ruled that the statement was admissible,
and that the state would be permitted to elicit the statement with leading questions to
mitigate the risk that the witnesses might testify that Davis told Thumm that he was
“going back to prison.” (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.745, L.8 – p.748, L.3) (emphasis added).
Then, as noted above, both Jeremy Steinmetz and Frankie Hughes testified that, after the
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attack in the hotel room, Paris Davis told Thumm that he was “going to prison.” (Trial
Tr., Vol. II, p.755, Ls.15-21; p.899, Ls.21-23.)
In his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm asserted that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to renew her pretrial objection to Davis’ statement on the
ground that the term “prison” constituted a legal conclusion. (R., pp.176-177.) Thumm
has failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient performance or prejudice with respect to
this claim. First, he has failed to demonstrate that the manner in which his trial counsel
approached this issue was anything but a tactical decision. Instead, Thumm appears to
dock this claim to an assumption that Thumm’s mere failure to renew the objection, after
raising it prior to trial, constitutes deficient performance.

However, counsel’s mere

failure to renew the objection does not constitute per se deficiency. As noted, the district
court deferred its ruling on the statement, and then during trial ruled that the statement
was admissible. This can be read as an overruling of Thumm’s counsel’s prior objection
that was already made. Further, Thumm has also failed to demonstrate, or argue, that the
statement was actually inadmissible. Davis’ use of the term “prison” did not constitute
some inadmissible “legal conclusion.”

The evidence was relevant to prove Davis’

knowledge that Thumm had committed an aggravated battery. Thumm has also failed to
demonstrate Strickland prejudice. Davis’ statement, while likely damaging to her case,
did not tend to prove Thumm’s guilt.
4.

Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Impeach Frankie
Hughes On The Specific Potential Exposure To Prison He Faced In
Connection With This Case

Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Hughes on the fact that he
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potentially faced up to 60 years of prison for his role in the attack. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.30-31.) However, as he district court correctly concluded (R., pp.383-384), this claim
fails as a matter of law.
For his role in the attack on Ohls (and Ohls’ girlfriend, Brooke Everhart), Hughes
was charged with two counts of aggravated battery and two counts of use of a deadly
weapon during the commission of a crime. (See
- - R., p.190.) In his amended postconviction petition, Thumm asserted that Hughes faced up to 60 years in prison for these
crimes, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Hughes about this
potential exposure and Hughes’ “great motivation to provide biased testimony against
[Thumm].” (R., pp.190-191.)
As the district court concluded (R., pp.383-384), this claim is belied by the record.
Thumm’s trial counsel did cross-examine Hughes on his potential bias related to his
criminal exposure. Specifically, Thumm’s trial counsel cross-examined Hughes on: (1)
his interview with police in which officers told him that they would “talk to the
prosecutor about getting probation”; and (2) the fact that, despite Hughes’ testimony
denying that he was involved in the attack on Ohls, Hughes was charged with two counts
of aggravated battery, and that these two charges had been bound over by a magistrate
judge. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.914, L.7 – p.916, L.9.) Later in the trial, Thumm’s counsel
elicited testimony indicating that Detective Holland told Hughes that he had a “good
chance” at probation in his case. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.988, Ls.13-17.) The state also
elicited testimony from Hughes about his aggravated battery charges. (Trial Tr., Vol. II,
p.908, Ls.2-19.) During his closing argument, Davis’ counsel referenced the aggravated
battery charges against Hughes (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.1138, L.25 – p.1139, L.13), and during
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her closing argument, Thumm’s counsel specifically argued that “Frankie [Hughes] has a
lot to gain by testifying and pointing the finger.” (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1157, L.24 – p.1158,
L.2.)
The fact that Thumm’s counsel did not elicit specific testimony about the
maximum length of the sentences potentially faced by Hughes does not demonstrate
Strickland deficient performance or prejudice. Therefore, Thumm has failed to show that
the district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim.
5.

Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective With Respect To The Manner In Which
She Cross-Examined Detectives Leavitt And Holland

Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim
that his trial counsel was ineffective for inadequately cross-examining Detectives Leavitt
and Holland. (Appellant’s brief, pp.35-37.) However, as the district court correctly
concluded (R., pp.384-385), this claim fails as matter of law.
Thumm’s trial counsel asked Detective Leavitt, upon cross-examination, about an
interview he conducted with Ohls. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.308, L.2 – p.309, L.2.) Counsel
asked Detective Leavitt if Detective Holland, who was also at the interview, presented
Ohls with a photo lineup.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.308, Ls.15-24.)

Detective Leavitt

responded that he could not recall without looking at his police report. (Trial Tr., Vol. I,
p.308, L.24 – p.309, L.2.)

Counsel did not attempt to refresh Detective Leavitt’s

recollection. Thumm’s counsel also asked Detective Leavitt whether Leavitt told Frankie
Hughes, during a police interview, that the police had fingerprints and DNA on a bottle
that would implicate Hughes in his battery of Ohls’ girlfriend, Brooke Everhart. (Trial
Tr., Vol. I, p.334, Ls.12-15.) The district court sustained the state’s hearsay objection to
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this question, because it was not Detective Leavitt that made this statement to Hughes.
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.334, L.16 – p.335, L.21.)
Detective Holland subsequently testified at the trial. (Trial. Tr., Vol. II, p.952,
p.16 – p.1027, L.6.) Upon cross-examination, Thumm’s trial counsel did not question
Detective Holland either about the lineup presented to Ohls, or the statement to Hughes.
(See Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.911, L.1 – p.914, L.1; p.985, L.9 – p.998, L.21; p.1026, Ls.1-21.)
In his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm argued that his trial counsel’s
cross-examination of Detectives Leavitt and Holland constituted ineffective assistance of
trial counsel because counsel ultimately failed to elicit testimony that: (1) the detectives
met with Ohls and Everhart, presented them both lineups, including one that included
Thumm, and that neither were able to identify a suspect; and (2) Detective Holland, in
fact, deceptively told Hughes that police had fingerprints and DNA on a bottle that would
implicate Hughes in his battery of Everhart. 11 (R., pp.191-193.)
As the district court concluded (R., pp.384-385), Thumm failed to establish
Strickland deficient performance or prejudice with respect to either sub-claim. Thumm
has failed to demonstrate that the decisions made by counsel in the course of her crossexamination of the detectives was anything but strategic. Further, the fact that Ohls
failed to identify Thumm in a lineup was of very minimal significance in this case. Ohls
testified at the jury trial and did not identify his attackers. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.501, L.7 –
p.516, L.21.) Ohls did not identify Thumm even in the suggestive context of a jury trial
at which Thumm was being charged in connection with the attack, and in fact, testified
that he did not remember Thumm even being in the hotel room that night. (Trial. Tr., Vol.
11

As discussed below, the fingerprint report was not actually generated until several
months later. (R., pp.202-203.)
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I, p.515, L.10 – p.516, L.21.) The fact that Ohls could also not identify Thumm in a
pretrial investigative lineup would not have benefitted Thumm.
Further, Thumm failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s decision not to crossexamine Detective Holland on his pretrial interview with Hughes constituted deficient
performance. Thumm has not demonstrated or alleged that Detective Holland’s deceptive
interview tactics were somehow improper. Further, as Thumm noted in his amended
post-conviction petition, his counsel possessed the police report in which Detective
Holland described his interview with Hughes.

(R., p.192.)

Thumm’s counsel’s

possession of this report, as well as her previous questioning of Detective Leavitt
regarding the same interview with Hughes, indicates that counsel’s decision not to follow
up with Holland was strategic, as opposed to being based on some objective shortcoming,
such as ignorance of the police report. Further, contrary to Thumm’s apparent assertion,
counsel’s decision not to follow-up on the issue after initially raising it with Detective
Leavitt does not constitute per se deficient performance. A defense attorney is entitled to
evolve her strategic approach to a case as the case develops. Finally, Thumm has also
failed to demonstrate Strickland prejudice. Thumm has not adequately explained how the
deceptive nature of Detective Holland’s interview with Hughes prejudiced Thumm’s case.
6.

Thumm’s Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To
Call Various Named Defense Witnesses Is Waived On Appeal

In his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm asserted that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to call various named individuals as witnesses during the trial.
(R., pp.171-172.) However, Thumm has not raised this claim in his Appellant’s brief.
(See generally Appellant’s brief.) Therefore, despite the fact that Thumm noted, in his
Appellant’s brief, that he was “expressly appealing the dismissal of the entire petition and
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all claims” (Appellant’s brief, p.13), this claim is waived pursuant to Zichko, 129 Idaho at
263, 923 P.2d at 970 (“[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument
are lacking”). In the alternative, should this Court choose to reach the merits of this
claim, the state adopts the reasoning set forth by the district court as to why this claim
fails as a matter of law. (R., pp.379-381.)
II.
Thumm Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel Claims
A.

Introduction
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. (Appellant’s brief, pp.20-21, 34 n.15,
39-41.) As the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.367, 385-387, 390-391), these
claims fail as a matter of law.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on
file.” Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803.

C.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Thumm’s Ineffective Assistance Of
Appellate Counsel Claims
The two-prong Strickland test for ineffective assistance of trial counsel also

applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho
859, 243 P.3d 675 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d
40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007)). In order to establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,
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a petitioner has the burden of proving that his counsel’s representation on appeal was
deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985);
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). Even if a defendant
requests that certain issues be raised on appeal, appellate counsel has no constitutional
obligation to raise every non-frivolous issue requested by the defendant. Jones v. Barnes,
463 U.S. 745, 751-753 (1983); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181
(1988) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-754). As explained by the United States Supreme
Court, “[e]xperienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the
importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central
issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues.” Jones, 463 U.S. at 752. The relevant
inquiry is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the
defendant would have prevailed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000);
Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 629, 226 P.3d 1269, 1276 (2010) (citing State v. Payne,
146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008)). It is “difficult” to demonstrate that
appellate counsel provided deficient performance simply for failing to raise a particular
claim. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 287-288.
Thumm’s appellate counsel raised numerous claims on direct appeal.
Specifically, appellate counsel asserted: (1) the district court erred by denying Thumm’s
motion for a mistrial after Hughes purportedly referenced Thumm’s alleged gang
affiliation during the trial; (2) the district court erred by ruling that if the defense called
Chris Smith to testify, then the state would be permitted to impeach his testimony that
both Thumm and Smith were alleged gang members; (3) an officer’s trial testimony that
Thumm invoked his rights constituted a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain
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silent; (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct in numerous respects during closing
argument; and (5) cumulative error. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 285 P.3d 348.
Thumm has failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient performance or prejudice
with respect to any of his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. 12 With
respect to each claim, Thumm has failed to adequately allege or demonstrate that his
appellate counsel’s decision not to raise the claims, or to not raise the claims in the
manner Thumm now assets they should have been raised, was based upon some objective
shortcoming. Further, Thumm has failed to demonstrate that any of these claims would
have been successful had they been raised on appeal, or that they were potentially more
meritorious than any of the claims appellate counsel actually chose to raise.
1.

Appellate Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Attempt To Raise
The Bruton Issue As Fundamental Error On Direct Appeal

Thumm contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for declining to
attempt to raise, as fundamental error, a claim that the joinder of his case with Paris
Davis’ case violated his Sixth Amendment rights pursuant to Bruton. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.20-21.) As the district court correctly concluded (R., p.367), this claim fails as a
matter of law.
In Mintun, 144 Idaho at 662, 168 P.3d at 46, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that
a claim alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise an issue as
fundamental error “is not meritorious” for a number of reasons, including: a rule allowing
such a claim “would be impractical, inefficient, and often disadvantageous to defendants
whose interest would be better served by presenting such a claim in a post-conviction
12

Thumm also raises ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims related to his
substantive Brady and prosecutorial misconduct post-conviction claims. The state
address these claims below, in the context of its response to those substantive claims.
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action asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel” for failing to object to the alleged
error in the trial court; and a trial counsel’s failure to object to errors may be done for
legitimate strategic or tactical purposes, and the record on appeal would rarely show this
strategy. Id. Thumm’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
attempt to raise a Bruton challenge as fundamental error therefore fails as a matter of law
and Thumm has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief. 13
On appeal, Thumm appears to argue that his appellate counsel could have raised a
Bruton challenge as preserved error on direct appeal. (Appellant’s brief, pp.20-21.)
Specifically, Thumm notes that Paris Davis’ counsel actually did raise an unsuccesful
Bruton challenge during the trial. (Id.; see also Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.744, Ls.12-22.)
Thumm contends that this showed that “the district court would have overruled a Bruton
objection had [Thumm’s] attorney made it, so it could be considered to have been
preserved error.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.21.)

Thumm did not cite authority for this

proposition that a co-defendant’s constitutional challenge is preserved for appeal if the
other co-defendant preserves an analogous challenge that her constitutional rights were
violated. As Thumm acknowledges (id.), an objection related to the violation of Thumm’s
constitutional rights “was not Paris Davis’ to make.” This is because, as Thumm further
acknowledged in his amended post-conviction petition (R., p.153), Davis’ Bruton
challenge could not be the same as Thumm’s Bruton challenge because the challenges
concern completely different statements, and thus require completely different analyses.
13

While the district court did not, in its summary dismissal order, cite Mintun or the
general principle upon which Mintun is based, it did note that “the [s]tate contends that
the ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to appellate counsel fail, because the
Bruton issue was not preserved for appeal….” (R., p.385.) Indeed, the state cited Mintun
and thus provided Thumm notice for this specific ground for dismissal, as required by
I.C. § 19-4906. (R., pp.123-124.)
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Therefore, if Thumm’s appellate counsel attempted to raise a Bruton challenge on direct
appeal, it would have been analyzed under the Idaho fundamental error framework
because Thumm’s trial counsel did not preserve this challenge with respect to Thumm’s
constitutional rights. Therefore, Thumm’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claim fails as a matter of law.
In the alternative, this claim also fails because, for all of the reasons discussed
above in Sec. I, Part D, a Bruton fundamental error challenge would have clearly been
unsuccessful on appeal, because no testimonial statements of Davis were entered into
evidence at trial.
2.

Thumm Has Failed To Show His Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective For
Failing To Raise Various Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims

Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim
that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise various prosecutorial
misconduct claims on direct appeal. (Appellant’s brief, pp.40-41.) As the district court
correctly concluded (R., pp.385, 390-391), this claim fails as a matter of law and Thumm
has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief.
On direct appeal, Thumm’s appellate counsel raised several prosecutorial
misconduct claims. Specifically, Thumm’s appellate counsel asserted that the prosecutor
committed misconduct by: (1) eliciting testimony from Hughes which indicated that
Thumm was a gang member; (2) appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury
during closing argument by asking the jury to picture themselves in the position of the
victim; (3) eliciting testimony from an officer that utilized Thumm’s pre-Miranda silence
to imply his guilt; and (4) misstating the reasonable doubt standard. Thumm, 153 Idaho
at 538, 542-544, 285 P.3d at 348, 357-359. The final three of these claims were raised as
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fundamental error on appeal. Id. In his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm
asserted that his appellate counsel was ineffective because “he did not raise all of the
issues of prosecutorial misconduct.” (R., p.178.) Specifically, Thumm contends that his
appellate counsel should have asserted, as fundamental error, that the prosecutor
additionally committed misconduct by: (1) eliciting testimony that Davis told Thumm
that he was “going to prison” after the attack; (2) making disparaging comments about
the defense during closing argument; (3) making statements about the victim during
closing argument that were unsupported by the evidence; (4) mischaracterizing Hughes’
trial testimony during closing argument; and (5) utilizing unnecessarily inflammatory
language when describing Thumm during closing argument. (R., p.177 n.15, 178, 184188.)
This claim is conclusory.

It does not constitute deficient performance for

appellate counsel to decline to raise “all of the issues of prosecutorial misconduct.”
Dunlap v. State, 159 Idaho 280, 296, 360 P.3d 289, 305 (2015) (“Courts have recognized
that appellate counsel may fail to raise an issue on appeal because counsel foresees little
or no likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is
widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.” (citations and
internal quotations omitted)). Thumm has additionally failed to argue or demonstrate that
appellate counsel’s decisions regarding which claims to raise were based upon some
objective shortcoming, or that the claims he raises now were more meritorious than the
claims actually raised by appellate counsel. Finally, as the district court concluded (R.,
pp.390-391), there was also no reasonable probability that the claims raised by Thumm
would have resulted in the vacating of his conviction if raised.
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3.

Thumm’s Claims That Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To
Raise And/Or Inadequately Raising Abel and Brady Issues Are Waived

Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claims
that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to attempt to raise Abel and Brady
claims on direct appeal. However, these claims are waived for appeal pursuant to Zichko,
129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970 (“[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either authority
or argument are lacking”), because Thumm has failed to support them with argument.
In his Appellant’s brief, Thumm only “noted” his claim that his appellate counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise an Abel claim in the context of a footnote.
(Appellant’s brief, p.34 n.15.) Likewise, while Thumm references, in passing, his claim
that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to attempt to raise a Brady claim on
direct appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.21, 39), Thumm failed to support this claim with
argument.
Even to the extent that either of these claims is not precluded by Zichko, they still
fail as a matter of law because Thumm has not attempted to demonstrate Strickland
deficient performance or prejudice with respect to either claim. Therefore, Thumm has
failed to show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing either claim.
III.
Thumm Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Brady Claim
A.

Introduction
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his Brady

claim that the state untimely disclosed certain fingerprint evidence. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.21-27.) This claim is forfeited pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b) because Thumm could
have raised it on direct appeal but did not.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on
file.” Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803.

C.

Thumm’s Post-Conviction Brady Claim Was Forfeited Pursuant To I.C. § 194901(b) Because It Was Not Raised On Direct Appeal
A post-conviction petition is not a substitute for a direct appeal, and any issue

which could have been raised to the trial court or on direct appeal, but was not, is
forfeited. I.C. § 19-4901(b); see also Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 702-703, 365 P.3d
1050, 1056-1057 (Ct. App. 2015).

A post-conviction petition may overcome this

forfeiture only if “it appears to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by
affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial
doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due
diligence, have been presented earlier.” Id.
The week prior to the trial, the state disclosed a fingerprint report to the defense.
(See Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.750, Ls.2-9.) During the trial, Thumm’s trial counsel objected to
the admission of the fingerprint report because it was untimely pursuant to the district
court’s pretrial orders. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.750, Ls.2-13.) The state explained that it just
itself obtained the report from the state crime laboratory the previous week, but that due
to late disclosure, it would not attempt to introduce the report as evidence at trial. (Trial
Tr., Vol. II, p.750, Ls.15-25.) The district court agreed with the parties and excluded the
evidence. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.751, Ls.1-13.)
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For the first time in his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm asserted that
the state’s untimely disclosure of the fingerprint evidence constituted a Brady violation.
(R., pp.179-184.) Thumm asserted that the fingerprint report, though not discussed at
trial as such, was actually exculpatory.

The fingerprint report indicated that Vance

Thumm was the source of the latent print found on a broken Jose Cuervo Tequila bottle
(Item 4A), but that Thumm was excluded as being the source of the latent prints
recovered on a certain Budweiser bottle, broken pieces of a Jose Cuervo Tequila bottle,
and an unopened bottle of Olde English 800 Malt Liquor (Items 3A-1, 3A-5, 3A-7, 4A/5B, 4B-3, 6A-1 and 6A/L3-B).

(R., pp.181-183, 202-203).

No latent prints were

discovered on several other tested pieces of evidence. (R., p.202.) Thumm asserts that
this report was exculpatory because there was no evidence presented at trial that anyone
was struck with the Tequila bottle – the only beverage container upon which Thumm’s
prints were found; and because Hughes testified at trial that Thumm struck Ohls with an
Olde English 800 Malt Liquor bottle and a Budweiser bottle – bottles seemingly similar
to those upon which Thumm was excluded as being a source of recovered prints. (R.,
pp.182-183; see also Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.879, L.8 – p.881, L.12.)
As the state argued in its brief in support of its motion for summary dismissal (R.,
pp.126-127), 14 Thumm’s Brady claim was forfeited pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b). While
the state’s disclosure of the fingerprint evidence was untimely pursuant to the district

14

The district court did not dismiss this claim on the ground that it was forfeited pursuant
to I.C. § 19-4901(b). However, the state’s utilization of this ground in its brief in support
of its motion for summary dismissal (R., pp.126-127), provided Thumm notice for this
specific ground for dismissal, as required by I.C. § 19-4906. Thumm’s specific response
to this ground for dismissal in his response to the state’s motion for summary dismissal
further indicates that he was actually aware of this ground for dismissal. (R., p.226.)
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court’s pretrial orders, disclosure still occurred prior to the jury trial. Therefore, this
claim could have been raised on direct appeal.
In his response to the state’s motion for summary dismissal, Thumm argued that
the Brady claim could not have been raised on direct appeal because the fingerprint
results were not in the appellate record.

(R., pp.225-226.)

However, “[i]t is the

responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient record to substantiate his or her
claims on appeal.” Greenfield v. Smith, 162 Idaho 246, 253, 395 P.3d 1279, 1286 (2017)
(citation omitted). Thumm has failed to demonstrate or argue that he could not, in the
exercise of due diligence, have included the fingerprint results in the appellate record.
This claim is therefore forfeited pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b).
Thumm also argued that the state’s response to his Brady claim constituted an
attempt to “whipsaw the Petitioner, asserting that the claim needed to be raised on direct
appeal while also asserting that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it
on direct appeal.” (R., p.226 n.2.) However, contrary to Thumm’s apparent assumption,
it can be possible both that an individual waived a post-conviction claim by failing to
include it in his direct appeal, and that the individual’s appellate counsel was not
constitutionally deficient for exercising a strategic choice not to raise the claim. Thumm
does not possess a universal right for this claim to be considered on its merits in the
manner of his choosing. This claim may only be considered by Idaho’s courts if raised in
compliance with applicable procedural rules regarding preservation and forfeiture.
In the alternative, Thumm’s Brady claim also fails on its merits. In order to
establish a Brady violation, there must be evidence that: (1) is favorable to the accused
because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was willfully or inadvertently
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suppressed by the state; and (3) was prejudicial or material in that there is a reasonable
probability that its disclosure to the accused would have led to a different result. State v.
Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 503, 399 P.32d 804, 830 (2017).

As the district court

concluded (R., p.368), there is no evidence that the state suppressed the fingerprint report,
either willfully or inadvertently. The jury trial commenced on October 26, 2009. (Trial
Tr., Vol. I, p.5.) The lab report, consistent with the prosecutor’s representation to the
court, was not generated until October 19, 2009, at which point, the state disclosed it.
(R., p.203.) While the report was properly excluded by the district court due to its
untimely generation and disclosure, there is no evidence that the report could have been
disclosed any earlier. Further, for all of the reasons discussed in greater detail below,
Thumm failed to demonstrate any probability that the report, if disclosed earlier, could
have been utilized by Thumm to secure a different trial result.

D.

Thumm’s Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Attempt To Utilize
The Fingerprint Evidence At Trial
Thumm also asserts, in the alternative to his Brady claim, that the district court

erred by summarily dismissing his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
recognize the exculpatory nature of the fingerprint evidence, and for failing to attempt to
utilize the report at trial. (Appellant’s brief, pp.26-27.) However, as the district court
concluded (R., pp.387-389), Thumm has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief on
this claim.
First, as the district court noted (R., p.388), the fingerprint report was of limited
usefulness in this case because Thumm was not actually charged with striking Ohls with
any beverage containers. (See Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.50, L.16 – p.51, L.4.) Further, the report
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did not disprove the state’s theory of the case or necessarily demonstrate that anyone
testified falsely about the attack. Hughes testified that Thumm struck Ohls with: (1) an
Olde English bottle that was not full and which was broken in the course of the attack;
and (2) a Budweiser bottle that was also broken in the course of the attack. (Trial Tr., Vol.
II, p.879, L.8 – p.881, L.12.) The Olde English bottle described by Hughes does not
appear to be the same bottle as the unopened Olde English Bottle (Item 6A), that was
found to contain prints from which Thumm was excluded as the contributor. (R., pp.202203.) Likewise, the Budweiser bottle described by Hughes does not clearly or necessarily
correspond to the specific Budweiser bottles, or pieces thereof, identified in the report
which contained prints from which Thumm was excluded as the contributor.

(Id.)

Therefore, and in light of the strength of the state’s case, Thumm has failed to
demonstrate that even had trial counsel attempted to utilize the fingerprint evidence, that
trial court would have admitted the evidence at that stage in the proceeding, let alone that
such evidence would have resulted in a different trial outcome.
IV.
Thumm Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims
A.

Introduction
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim

that the prosecutor committed misconduct in numerous respects during closing argument.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.39-41.) As the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.389-391),
these claims were forfeited because they could have been raised on direct appeal and
were not.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on
file.” Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803.

C.

Thumm’s Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims Are Forfeited
As discussed above, a post-conviction petition is not a substitute for a direct

appeal, and any issue which could have been raised to the trial court or on direct appeal,
but was not, is forfeited. I.C. § 19-4901(b); see also Bias, 159 Idaho at 702-703, 365 P.3d
at 1056-1057. A post-conviction petition may overcome this forfeiture only if “it appears
to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or
otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability
of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented
earlier.” Id.
In this case, as the district court recognized (R., pp.390-391), each of Thumm’s
prosecutorial misconduct claims could have been raised on direct appeal. Thumm has not
argued to the contrary. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.39-41.) Therefore, these claims are
forfeited, and Thumm has failed to show that the district court erred.

D.

Thumm’s Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Object To The
Alleged Instances Of Prosecutorial Misconduct At Trial
Thumm argues, in the alternative, that if his prosecutorial misconduct claims

could not be raised in his post-conviction petition, then his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to preserve these claims with a contemporaneous trial objection. (Appellant’s
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brief, p.40.) However, as the district court concluded (R., pp.389-391), this alternative
claim fails as a matter of law.
This claim is conclusory. Thumm has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s
decision not to object to the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct was anything
but strategic. Nor has Thumm demonstrated that any of the objections would have been
successful, let alone that they would have changed the outcome of the proceeding.
Further, “[f]rom a strategic perspective…many trial lawyers refrain from
objecting during closing argument to all but the most egregious misstatements by
opposing counsel on the theory that the jury may construe their objections to be a sign of
desperation or hyper-technicality.” United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir.
1991).

A defense attorney may also decide to not object because he believes the

prosecutor’s argument is helpful to his case or believes he can capitalize on the
prosecutor’s statements during his own closing argument.

Id.; see also Lambert v.

McBride, 365 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Under Strickland, we must note that there
may very well be strategic reasons for counsel not to object during closing arguments.
Counsel may have been trying to avoid calling attention to the statements and thus giving
them more force.”); United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) (counsel’s
decision not to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument “falls within the range of
permissible conduct of trial counsel”). “Whatever the actual explanation, Strickland
requires [the Court] to ‘indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’”

Molina, 934 F.2d at 1448

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “This presumption especially applies to silence in
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the face of allegedly improper arguments.” Vicory v. State, 81 S.W.3d 725, 731 (Mo.
App. 2002) (citation omitted).
In light of the strong presumption that a trial attorney’s decisions regarding
whether to object during closing argument are strategic, and the absence of evidence to
the contrary in this case, Thumm has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on
this claim or that the district court erred by summarily dismissing it.

V.
Thumm Has Failed To Demonstrate Cumulative Error
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in themselves,
may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,
453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to application of the doctrine is a
finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App.
1998). Therefore, since a finding of Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel requires
a showing of both deficient performance and prejudice, there is no prejudice to cumulate
when a petitioner has failed to demonstrate more than one incident of deficient
performance. See Spotz, 18 A.3d at 321. The ultimate question of Strickland prejudice,
and thus, how Strickland prejudice may “cumulate,” is whether the defendant was denied
“a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
In his amended post-conviction petition and supporting briefing, Thumm asserted
that the numerous instances of deficient performance of his trial counsel resulted in
cumulative prejudice. (R., pp.148-149, 226.) As discussed above, Thumm framed his
underlying post-conviction petition, and this appeal, as presenting a series of instances of
deficient performance which, while relatively insignificant individually, cumulated to
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constitute a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
(See Tr., p.31, L.25 – p.32, L.8; Appellant’s brief, p.1.)
On appeal, while Thumm cited the cumulative error standard (Appellant’s brief,
p.12), and asserted, in a conclusory manner, that the instances of deficient performance
had a “cumulative effect” (Appellant’s brief, p.1), he has not provided specific argument
regarding the manner in which prejudice cumulated and why he is entitled to relief.
Therefore, the state asserts that this claim is waived pursuant to Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263,
923 P.2d at 970 (“A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument
is lacking, not just if both are lacking.” (emphasis added)).
In any event, should this Court choose to the address the merits of Thumm’s claim
of cumulative Strickland prejudice, the state submits that this claim fails as a matter of
law, and the district court therefore properly dismissed it. For the reasons discussed
above, Thumm failed to demonstrate any instances of Strickland deficient performance,
let alone multiple errors that could be cumulated.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order
summarily dismissing Thumm’s post-conviction petition.
DATED this 9th day of May, 2018.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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